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IS ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION




What is the relationship between alternative dispute resolution
(ADR) and the rule of law? In the United States, critics often argue
that the informal, private nature of ADR' is hostile to the rule of
law-and ultimately to justice itself. Yet over the last ten years, a
broad, international array of groups has advocated including ADR in
projects designed to foster the rule of law in other countries. This
Article explores the paradox. Have we erred in condemning ADR
domestically or in promoting it internationally? Or does the desirabil-
ity of ADR depend upon the nature of the system in which it is being
utilized? By studying this paradox, we can enrich our understanding
of the ultimate purposes of both ADR and the rule of law, and thus
assist our search for justice.
II. THE DOMESTIC CRITIQUE OF ADR AS
HOSTILE TO THE RULE OF LAW
Although disputes have been resolved through means other than
litigation for thousands of years, it is well established that an ADR
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1. Although I use the term ADR in this Article extensively, I have previously expressed, and
continue to hold, many reservations about the value of the term. Jean R. Sternlight, Is Binding
Arbitration a Form of ADR?: An Argument That the Term "ADR" Has Begun to Outlive Its
Usefulness, 2000 J. Disp. RESOL. 97. As I argued in that article, arbitration and mediation are
extremely different from one another, and arbitration is more similar to litigation than it is to
mediation or negotiation. I generally prefer the phrase "appropriate dispute resolution" because
it more accurately captures the notion that litigation, arbitration, mediation, and negotiation are
alternatives to one another. Id. at 97 n.1. Nonetheless, in this Article I will use the common
definition of ADR.
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boom took place in the United States beginning in the 1970s.2 In-
spired by concerns about efficiency, access, and justice, ADR advo-
cates urged that disputes be resolved, not only in public trials, but also
through negotiation, mediation, and arbitration.3 The growth of ADR
also sparked a series of significant critiques by people concerned with
the privatization and informalization of dispute resolution. They ar-
gue that the privatization of dispute resolution is problematic because
the elaboration of law achieved in public trials and published deci-
sions is necessary to protect and enhance individual rights.4 Similarly,
some critics urge that treating disputes as matters of individual, rather
than public, concern eliminates important public accountability. 5
Others argue that dispute resolution fails to serve an important educa-
tional function when it is privatized. 6 Another common criticism is
that the establishment of dispute resolution processes weakens the po-
sition of less powerful members of society.7 For example, when pri-
2. Harvard Law Professor Frank Sander's speech at the 1976 Pound Conference is often used
to mark the date of the resurgence of ADR. Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing,
70 F.R.D. 79 (1976); e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-door
Courthouse at Twenty: Fait Accompli, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J.
ON Disp. RESOL. 297, 309 (1996).
3. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion Movement Is Re-shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 165, 170-85 (2003) (dis-
cussing the community justice, court administration, and business interest strands of the ADR
movement); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of
Innovation Co-opted or "the Law of ADR," 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1991) ("In what has
become a commonly recognized division in the literature and advocacy about ADR, we see two
basically different justifications for processes that resolve cases short of trial-what I call quanti-
tative-efficiency claims versus qualitative-justice claims.").
4. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Commentary, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or
Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668, 675-82 (1986) (cautioning that a virtue of adjudication is its
ability to ensure the proper resolution and application of public values, and that public officials,
not private individuals, must interpret the values of the Constitution and statutes); Owen M.
Fiss, Commentary, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) (urging that by resolving
disputes through settlements rather than through adjudication, justice is sacrificed for peace);
David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2622-23
(1995) (noting that private adjudications fail to produce rules or binding precedents).
5. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and Demo-
cratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663 (1995) [hereinafter Menkel-
Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway] (providing a balanced discussion of this critique and
raising the question of whether it is best to approach disputes as an individual or group concern).
6. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV.
1631, 1661-65 (2005) (discussing the public education function of dispute resolution systems).
7. See, e.g., Hensler, supra note 3, at 196 ("In a democracy where many people are shut out of
legislative power ... collective litigation . . . provides an alternative strategy for group action.");
Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy and Pacification in the
Movement to Re-form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 1, 14 (1993) (arguing that
the unwritten, informal law of mediation avoids "[d]iscussion of blame or rights," and is "re-
placed by the rhetoric of compromise and relationship," which "thereby obscur[es] issues of
unequal social power"); Judith Resnik, Procedure's Projects, 23 Civ. JUST. Q. 273, 276 (2004)
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vate companies use form contracts to require their customers or
employees to resolve disputes outside the courtroom, companies have
an incentive to skew the processes in their favor.8 In addition, some
have criticized the informalization of dispute resolution on the ground
that prejudices are more likely to manifest themselves in informal set-
tings. 9 Similarly, some have argued that women-traditionally less
powerful members of society-may be worse off in mediation or other
ADR processes than they are in litigation, especially in family law
matters. 10
Together, these critiques can be seen as attacking alternative modes
of dispute resolution for undermining the rule of law. Certainly, the
private and informal resolution of disputes does not allow for the for-
mal explication of rules envisioned by Lon Fuller and other rule of
law advocates." While supporters of ADR have responded to these
critiques,12 few commentators have defended ADR on the ground
(stating that while adjudication is far from perfect due to lack of access, it is relatively attractive
as compared to ADR "because it is self-limited, self-conscious, and relatively transparent,
whereas the alternative forms of process attend too little to their own power as well as to the
effects of disputants' power and position on strategic interaction, opportunities, knowledge, and
the legitimacy of outcomes").
8. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's
Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 674-97 (1996).
9. See, e.g., Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice
in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359, 1375-91 (explaining that traditional
adjudicatory settings with defined rules and a formal structure provide rational control, whereas
informal settings encourage prejudicial behavior because majority group members are allowed a
wider scope for emotional and behavioral idiosyncrasies); see also Richard Delgado, Alternative
Dispute Resolution Conflict as Pathology: An Essay for Trina Grillo, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1391,
1398 (1997) (reiterating concerns that without a formal court proceeding to remind participants
of the American values of equality and fairness, majority group members are less hesitant to
express and act upon their prejudices).
10. See, e.g., Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE
L.J. 1545 (1991).
11. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 38-39 (1964) (explaining that compliance with
the rule of law demands that laws must actually be established, that such laws must be ade-
quately publicized, that rules should apply only prospectively, that rules must be understandable,
that rules shall not be contradictory, that it must be possible to conform to the rules, and that the
rules must be administered in the intended manner in which they are announced); Antonin
Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989) (advocating that
judges rely, to the extent possible, on general rules, rather than on totality of the circumstances
analyses).
12. See, e.g., Robert C. Bordone et al., The Next Thirty Years: Directions and Challenges in
Dispute Resolution, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 507, 510 (Michael L. Moffitt &
Robert C. Bordone eds., 2005) (suggesting that while concerns about ADR may be valid, critics
often overstate their arguments and depict an oversimplified understanding of dispute resolu-
tion); Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway, supra note 5, at 2669-70 (responding to
criticisms voiced by Professor Owen Fiss and others, and urging that settlement promotes such
values as "consent, participation, empowerment, dignity, respect, empathy and emotional cathar-
sis, privacy, efficiency, quality solutions, equity, access, and yes, even justice").
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that it enhances the rule of law. The strength and appeal of the rule of
law critique should not be underestimated. In the United States, even
many of ADR's staunchest advocates recognize that there are circum-
stances in which disputes are better resolved publicly, through litiga-
tion, rather than through negotiation, mediation, arbitration, or some
other private means. 13
III. THE INTERNATIONAL EXPORT OF ADR IN
RULE OF LAW PROJECTS
The relationship between ADR and the rule of law is seen quite
differently in the context of international law reform efforts. Interna-
tionally, the rule of law has been converted from a philosophical con-
struct into a series of aid projects involving significant funding. One
commentator notes that since 1990 the World Bank alone has spon-
sored 330 rule of law projects totaling $2.9 billion. 14
Traditional rule of law programs have been designed to train judges,
build courthouses, publicize judicial decisions, and computerize and
organize court files. But beginning in the mid-1990s, international aid
organizations began to urge foreign countries to adopt ADR as a
means to modernize their legal systems and instill greater respect for
the rule of law. Recent international ADR projects often include ef-
forts to train mediators and arbitrators, revise laws to make them
more supportive of mediation and arbitration, inform judges about
the benefits of ADR, and provide technical support and training
materials.
The United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) has been one of the leading organizations sponsoring the
use of ADR as part of rule of law projects. In March 1998, USAID's
Center for Democracy and Governance published an extensive man-
ual entitled Alternative Dispute Resolution Practitioners' Guide (ADR
Practitioners' Guide), which explained the nature and benefits of
ADR and provided numerous examples of ADR throughout the
13. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway, supra note 5, at 2695 (recognizing
that certain settlements, such as mass tort actions, have such a significant impact on our justice
system that "public exposure of such cases may be a necessary part of our democratic process"
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
14. David M. Trubek, The "Rule of Law" in Development Assistance: Past, Present, and Fu-
ture, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 74, 74 (David
M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).
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world.1 5 The introduction to the ADR Practitioners' Guide explains
the purported link between ADR and the rule of law:
USAID's work in promoting the rule of law in developing and tran-
sitional societies over the last decade has led to an interest in the
use of. . . "ADR." Several reasons underlie this interest. ADR is
touted as more efficient and effective than the courts in providing
justice, especially in countries in which the judiciary has lost the
trust and respect of the citizens. Moreover, ADR is seen as a means
to increase access to justice for populations that cannot or will not
use the court system, to address conflicts in culturally appropriate
ways, and to maintain social peace.16
While recognizing that ADR programs "cannot be a substitute for a
formal judicial system," the ADR Practitioners' Guide urges that
ADR can decrease the cost and length of dispute resolution, increase
access to justice for disempowered groups, and "increase disputants'
satisfaction with outcomes. 1 7 Nonetheless, it explains that ADR is
not always appropriate; programs must be properly designed to suit
the unique circumstances of the particular country.18
USAID backs its philosophy that ADR is an important component
of the rule of law by funding ADR projects in various countries. For
example, in El Salvador, where USAID seeks to increase access to
justice, transparency, and accountability, the agency plans to
strengthen and expand mediation centers throughout the country.19
In Guyana, USAID has created a mediation center to resolve civil
disputes and reduce case backlogs. 20 In Honduras, it has sponsored
the development of ADR systems as a means of improving "access to
15. CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & GOVERNANCE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PRACTI-
TIONERS' GUIDE (1998), available at http://www.usaid.gov/our-work/democracy-and-
govemance/publications/pdfs/pnacb895.pdf [hereinafter ADR PRACTITIONERS' GUIDE].
16. Id. at 1. The ADR Practitioners' Guide also spells out how ADR can serve rule of law
objectives in more detail. See id. at 7-17. It urges that "ADR programs can support not only
rule of law objectives, but also other development objectives, such as economic development,
development of a civil society, and support for disadvantaged groups, by facilitating the resolu-
tion of disputes that are impeding progress toward these objectives." Id. at 3.
17. Id. (emphasis omitted).
18. See id. In its appendix, the ADR Practitioners' Guide provides case studies of ADR pro-
grams used in Bangladesh, Bolivia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, and the Ukraine as a means to
examine when ADR is and is not effective in developing and transitioning countries. ADR
PRACTITIONERS' GUIDE, supra note 15, app. B.
19. USAID, Budget: El Salvador (2006), http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/lac/sv.
html; USAID, Data Sheet: El Salvador (2005), available at http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/
cbj2005/lac/pdf/519-002.pdf.
20. USAID, Budget: Guyana (2006), http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/lac/gy.html;




justice for marginalized groups, including women and the poor. '21 On
the other side of the world, USAID is supporting Nepalese commu-
nity mediation as a way to resolve disputes locally and promote com-
munity solidarity.22 In Africa, it has supported the Rwandan Gacaca,
an indigenous mediation program promoting truth and reconcilia-
tion.23 Finally, in Yemen, USAID has sought to formalize conflict res-
olution solutions initiated by local council members and integrate
traditional means of conflict resolution into more modern
techniques. 24
The American Bar Association (ABA) has been another leader in
the movement to encourage greater reliance on ADR as part of its
international rule of law projects. The most active arm of the ABA
has been its Central European and Eurasian Law Institute (CEELI). 25
The organization's website explains that "CEELI is a public service
project of the American Bar Association that advances the rule of law
in the world by supporting the legal reform process in Central and
Eastern Europe, Eurasia and the Middle East."'26 Since the mid-
1990s, CEELI has engaged in projects including training mediators in
Armenia,27 fostering the development of small businesses in Azerbai-
jan by providing ADR assistance, 28 promoting ADR in Bosnia, 29 as-
sisting in the drafting of a new Bulgarian Mediation Act, providing
mediation training to Bulgaria's judges, attorneys, and citizens, 30 and
producing a mediation bench book for Serbian trial judges and a train-
ing video to inform the general public about the potential advantages
of mediation.31
21. USAID, Data Sheet: Honduras (2005), available at http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/
cbj2005/lac/pdf/522-021.pdf.
22. USAID, Data Sheet: Nepal (2005), available at http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/
cbj2005/ane/pdf/367-007.pdf.
23. Erin Daly, Between Punitive and Reconstructive Justice: The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, 34
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 355, 357 n.6 (2002).
24. USAID, Data Sheet: Yemen (2005), available at http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/
cbj2005/ane/pdf/279-zzz.pdf.
25. For general background on CEELI, see Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative,
http://www.abanet.org/ceeli (last visited Jan. 17, 2007).
26. Id.
27. CEELI: Armenia, http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/countries/armenia/program.html (last vis-
ited Jan. 17, 2007).
28. CEELI: Azerbaijan, http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/countries/azerbaijan/program.html (last
visited Jan. 17, 2007).
29. CEELI: Bosnia & Herzegovina, http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/countries/bosnia/program.
html (last visited Jan. 17, 2007).
30. CEELI Programs: Bulgaria, http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/countries/bulgaria/program.html
(last visited Jan. 17, 2007).
31. CEELI Programs: Serbia, http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/countries/serbia/program.html (last
visited Jan. 17, 2007).
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In addition, ABA law reform groups around the world have advo-
cated the use of ADR as part of rule of law projects. For example, the
ABA Latin American Legal Initiatives Council has been operating a
mediation project in Mexico that promotes "court-annexed mediation
in twenty-two states" and has now trained over 200 mediators.32 Simi-
larly, the ABA Africa Law Initiative Council has done extensive train-
ing of Rwandan community mediators,33 and the ABA Asia Law
Initiative has sought to ensure that the Emergency Loya Jirga, essen-
tially an indigenous Afghan ADR system, operates fairly and
transparently. 34
Other international aid organizations are also sponsoring ADR
projects to foster the rule of law. For example, the World Bank is
promoting ADR in Bangladesh, Peru, and Sri Lanka to improve ac-
cess to justice, as well as efficiency, transparency, and responsive-
ness. 35  Similarly, the High Level Commission on Legal
Empowerment of the Poor (HLCLEP) sponsored a conference in
May 2006 to consider whether and how ADR might be used to "ex-
pand access to legal protection and the rule of law" and to "contribute
most effectively to poverty reduction. '36
In the international context, ADR is said to foster the rule of law in
several ways: (1) it may increase access to justice by making it easier
for people who are poor, illiterate, or geographically dispersed to
bring or respond to a claim;37 (2) it may reduce the amount of money
and time needed to resolve disputes;38 (3) it may provide an alterna-
32. ABA-LALIC: Mediation Project in Mexico, http://www.abanet.org/lalic/mediationproject
mexico.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2007).
33. ABA Africa Law Initiative: Access to Justice, http://www.abanet.org/aba-africa/projects/
accessjustice.shtml (last visited Jan. 17, 2007).
34. INT'L RES. GROUP ET AL., FILLING THE VACUUM: PREREQUISITES TO SECURITY IN AF-
GHANISTAN 1, 10, 31-33 (2002), available at http://www.ifes.org/publication/Of5d46dlbd36b7b79c
03116bc523cc72/CRAFT.pdf.
35. See The World Bank, Legal and Judicial Capacity Building Project: Bangladesh (2001),
http://web.worldbank.org/externa/projects/main?pagePK=64312881&piPK=64302848&thesiteP
K=40941&&Projectid=P044810; The World Bank, Judicial Reform Project: Peru (1997), http://
web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=64312881&piPK=64302848&theSitePK=40
941&Projectid=P040107; The World Bank, Legal and Judicial Reforms Project: Sri Lanka
(2000), http://web.worldbank.org/externallprojects/main?pagePK=64283627&piPK=73230&the
SitePK=40941&menuPK=228424&Projectid=P044809.
36. HLCLEP, UK DFID/UNECE Regional Conference on Alternative Dispute Resolution,
Mediation and Third Party Arbitration (TPAC) (May 23-24, 2006) (on file with author).
37. ADR PRACTITIONERS' GUIDE, supra note 15, at 13; Robert Kossick, The Rule of Law and
Development in Mexico, 21 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 715, 786 (2004).
38. ADR PRACTITIONERS' GUIDE, supra note 15, at 16; Maria Dakolias, A Strategy for Judi-
cial Reform: The Experience in Latin America, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 167, 201 n.144 (1995).
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tive to corrupt or biased court systems; 39 (4) it may promote foreign
investment opportunities; 40 (5) it may provide justice to groups, such
as women and minorities, whose interests are not well served by the
formal legal system;4' (6) it may bring community members together
and establish greater social harmony;42 (7) it may bring about political
reform;43 and (8) it may help community members work together to
better protect their individual rights.44
Some doubt whether ADR actually serves these admirable pur-
poses.45 Furthermore, some argue that the exportation of ADR may
be imperialistic. 46 However, rather than focus on the practical ques-
39. ADR PRACTITIONERS' GUIDE, supra note 15, at 10; Dakolias, supra note 38, at 200;
Thomas J. Moyer & Emily Stewart Haynes, Mediation as a Catalyst for Judicial Reform in Latin
America, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 619, 621 (2003).
40. Anthony Wanis-St. John, Implementing ADR in Transitioning States: Lessons Learned
from Practice, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 339, 345 (2000); see also ADR PRACTITIONERS' GUIDE,
supra note 15, at 17.
41. ADR PRACTITIONERS' GUIDE, supra note 15, at 10; Amy J. Cohen, Debating the Global-
ization of U.S. Mediation: Politics, Power, and Practice in Nepal, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 295,
299 (2006). See generally Christopher Gibson & Michael Woolcock, Empowerment and Local
Level Conflict Mediation in Indonesia: A Comparative Analysis of Concepts, Measures, and Pro-
ject Efficacy (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3713, Sept. 2005), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=806225 (arguing that deploying mediation in Indonesian communities can em-
power local populations and ultimately promote equality).
42. ADR PRACTITIONERS' GUIDE, supra note 15, at 11, 19; Moyer & Haynes, supra note 39, at
654 ("[M]ediation can act as a unifying process by bringing disparate groups together to work
collectively to establish peace in war torn societies."); Okechukwu Oko, The Problems and Chal-
lenges of Lawyering in Developing Societies, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 569, 641 (2004) (urging that ADR
can play an important role in reestablishing social harmony, and focusing specifically on the
example of Nigeria).
43. ADR PRACTITIONERS' GUIDE, supra note 15, at 7, 18 (asserting that ADR programs can
increase civic engagement and improve the skills and abilities of local political leaders); Moyer &
Haynes, supra note 39, at 667 (arguing that mediation promotes participation in government by
engendering trust in governmental institutions).
44. ADR PRACTITIONERS' GUIDE, supra note 15, at 14 (stating that Bangladeshi women who
participate in ADR "believe that they receive better protection and more compensation ... than
from the formal court system"); Cohen, supra note 41, at 337-40 (exploring the use of "rights-
based" mediation in Nepal); see also C.J. Larkin & Pamela A. DeVoe, Community Mediation in
the Shadow of Revolution: The Nepal Experience, ACRESOLUTION, Summer 2006, at 20
(describing the use of rights-based community mediation in Nepal).
45. See, e.g., Cynthia Alkon, The Cookie Cutter Syndrome: Legal Reform Assistance Under
Post-communist Democratization Programs, 2002 J. DisP. RESOL. 327, 346-47, 365 (cautioning
that ADR is "no magic pill" that can solve every country's legal system ills); Douglas H. Yarn,
Transnational Conflict Resolution Practice: A Brief Introduction to the Context, Issues, and
Search for Best Practice in Exporting Conflict Resolution, 19 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 303, 304
(2002) (suggesting that external mediators may sometimes, particularly in Africa, impede the
progress toward peace).
46. See, e.g., Laura Nader & Elisabetta Grande, Current Illusions and Delusions About Con-
flict Management-In Africa and Elsewhere, 27 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 573, 591 (2002) ("U.S.-
style alternative dispute resolution is being imposed on many unwilling recipients in foreign
countries as a requirement for development aid ...."); Matthew C. Stephenson, A Trojan Horse
Behind Chinese Walls? Problems and Prospects of U.S.-Sponsored "Rule of Law" Reform
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tion of whether or when ADR actually fulfills its espoused goals, this
Article examines the more theoretical question of whether ADR is
consistent with the rule of law in the international context. Many
commentators have questioned whether ADR can actually achieve its
goals, but few, if any, have challenged this fundamental premise.
IV. RECONCILING THE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ADR
AND THE RULE OF LAW
If ADR is seen as an important component of international rule of
law efforts, why do critics in the United States think it is inconsistent
with the rule of law? I see three ways to resolve this apparent conflict.
First, one of the perspectives may simply be wrong. Perhaps either
the domestic critics of ADR or the international advocates of ADR
have missed the boat and need to learn more from the writings or
experiences of the other side. Many who criticize ADR domestically
would also criticize ADR internationally, and many who defend ADR
domestically would also defend it internationally. Second, perhaps
the domestic and international contexts are distinguishable, so that
ADR might be hostile to the rule of law domestically and yet support-
ive of it internationally. This explanation has some attractive aspects.
However, after exploring these two theories, I offer a third, which I
believe is more useful and enriches our full understanding of the rela-
tionship between ADR and the rule of law, and how both relate to
justice. Specifically, I urge that those who advocate the use of ADR
as part of international rule of law projects have instinctively and intu-
itively recognized that both ADR, and more traditional litigation-
based rule of law projects, can be useful under certain circumstances.
Yet more work needs to be done to determine how litigation and
ADR properly relate to one another.
A. Is One Side or the Other Flat Wrong?
While some would argue that one group or the other is just wrong,
this explanation does not seem to be the most likely or desirable way
to resolve the paradox. As I have noted, although some may view the
domestic ADR critics or the international ADR advocates as extrem-
ists, few commentators would go so far as to say there is no tension
Projects in the People's Republic of China, 18 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 64, 89 (2000) (suggesting
that rule of law projects being undertaken in China are eroding native ADR techniques, thereby
adversely affecting access to dispute resolution for the poor): Wanis-St. John, supra note 40, at
345-46 (questioning the efficacy of ADR programs and noting that problems of asymmetry may
arise when mediation is used to resolve disputes between parties of disparate power).
2007]
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between ADR and the rule of law domestically. At least in some situ-
ations, such as the oft-cited Brown v. Board of Education,47 virtually
all ADR advocates admit that litigation serves important public pur-
poses that should be protected and preserved.48
Similarly, while the international export of ADR has been criticized
in particular situations, and while the specific content of the export
can be problematic, it is hard to deny that some forms of ADR can, on
occasion, serve laudable rule of law purposes. For example, USAID
and the Inter-American Development Bank are sponsoring mediation
training in Nicaragua to provide disputants with greater access to jus-
tice.49 Interestingly, the Nicaraguan model permits the mediation of
domestic violence claims, even though mediating these claims is typi-
cally frowned upon in the United States.50 Although program observ-
ers Raquel Aldana and Leticia Saucedo criticize the way mediation is
being implemented in Mulukukti, they find it preferable to retain a
mediation program and to continue to apply it to certain domestic
violence cases, rather than rely purely on a litigation model.51 They
conclude that, in some cases, mediation could be more successful than
litigation in addressing the root causes of domestic violence, and that
mediation has the advantage of "relatively easy access to justice and
47. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
48. See, e.g., Bordone et al., supra note 12, at 510 (rejecting the idea that all disputes should be
resolved consensually, rather than through litigation); Lela P. Love, Images of Justice, I PEPP.
Disp. RESOL. L.J. 29, 29-30 (2000) (emphasizing the public's interest in litigation given its open-
ness, impartiality, and opportunity for appellate review); Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It
Anyway, supra note 5, at 2670 (advocating the value of settlement in dispute resolution, but
acknowledging that the public's interest in litigation may sometimes outweigh that value).
49. Raquel Aldana & Leticia Saucedo, The Illusion of Transformative Conflict Resolution:
Mediating Domestic Violence in Nicaragua (undated manuscript) (draft on file with author)
(describing a project known as Caminos, which includes work with six pilot communities).
50. The Maria Luisa Ortiz Center, a feminist cooperative, "convinced the Nicaraguan Su-
preme Court to establish a mediation center in Mulukukti," and urged that domestic violence
claims should be mediated. Id. at 1, 21-22. Yet feminists and others in the United States are
often staunchly opposed to the mediation of domestic violence claims. See, e.g., Karla Fischer et
al., The Culture of Battering and the Role of Mediation in Domestic Violence Cases, 46 SMU L.
REV. 2117 (1993); Scott H. Hughes, Elizabeth's Story: Exploring Power Imbalances in Divorce
Mediation, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 553, 569-70 (1995).
51. In particular, they are skeptical that mediation can truly transform disputants, particularly
where the mode of mediation being used is not that proposed by the advocates of "transforma-
tive" mediation. Aldana & Saucedo, supra note 49, at 2. They are also concerned that the
emphasis on harmony and procedural informality may aggravate victimization caused by domes-
tic violence, and that by emphasizing individual over collective approaches, mediation may un-
dercut group political efforts. Id. Aldana and Saucedo rely substantially on the work of
anthropologist Sally Engle Merry in structuring their critiques. See generally SALLY ENGLE
MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE: TRANSLATING INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO
JUSTICE (2006); Sally Engle Merry, Rights, Religion, and Community: Approaches to Violence
Against Women in the Context of Globalization, 35 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 39 (2001).
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its relative avoidance of re-victimization issues in the domestic vio-
lence context.152 By contrast, they concluded that the litigation ap-
proach is severely impeded by a lack of access to justice-particularly
in rural areas where roads are virtually nonexistent-as well as by the
criminal justice system's inability to fundamentally address the root
causes of domestic violence. 53 Thus, they propose retaining and refin-
ing the mediation program so that it becomes an adjunct to litigation,
rather than its replacement. 54 They further propose that the media-
tion model should be adjusted in order to "be able to reclaim the 'po-
litical' in the personal, and ... incorporate and capitalize on the local
strengths of Mulukukil, including their own cultural notions of conflict
resolution."55
Similarly, Professor Amy Cohen describes a mediation project in
rural Nepal and finds that "mediation," at least as defined and imple-
mented there,56 is being used to enforce and support human rights.57
In particular, Cohen describes a donor-sponsored "mediation" train-
ing session:
The facilitator in Nepal ... began his training ... by lighting three
candles: the first dedicated to the "martyrs of democracy," the sec-
ond to "fighters for human rights," and the third to "victims of
[state] torture." Voice rising, he continued to describe the desper-
ate state of human rights in Nepal: "When will this end? We don't
know. Even the government does not obey the Constitution. We
must protect the human rights guaranteed in our Constitution, espe-
cially women's rights .... This is what this training is for." And by
this he meant using the dialogic practices of mediation to work to-
wards the non-violent resolution of disputes-a classic ADR aspira-
tion-yet, in so doing, deploying a range of interventionist
52. Aldana & Saucedo, supra note 49, at 25.
53. Id. at 2-3, 6-7. Aldana and Saucedo note, for example, that most government services are
administered in Siuna, the region's governmental seat, which is approximately seventy kilome-
ters away from Mulukukti. Id. at 7. While that might not seem terribly far on a highway, travel-
ing seventy kilometers on a washed out road can take hours and hours. Even phone service is
minimal in rural areas like Mulukukti. Additionally, the Nicaraguan legal system requires
women who file private claims against their batterers "to bear the costs of the investigation, an
attorney, and the prosecution of the claim." Id. at 27.
54. Id. at 3.
55. Id.
56. 1 put "mediation" in quotes because some would disagree that the dispute resolution tool
that Professor Cohen described was appropriately labeled "mediation." She explained that the
Nepalese process "is often public and coercive," and purposely enunciates the political demands
of members of the society. Cohen, supra note 41, at 298.
57. Id. at 297; see also Larkin & DeVoe, supra note 44 (explaining that Nepalese mediation is
special because mediators use their powers to protect human rights, the mediation is a substitute
for, rather than an alternative to, litigation, and mediation programs seek to remedy power im-
balances by affording legal counsel to less powerful disputants).
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strategies to push forward a substantive-and classically non-
ADR-human rights project. 58
The reports on the uses of ADR in Nicaragua, Nepal, and elsewhere
cast doubt on the idea that ADR cannot be supportive of law and
rights.
B. Distinguishing the Domestic and International Contexts
One way to reconcile the two alternative perspectives on ADR is to
view ADR as a second-best means of achieving justice. Specifically,
one could argue that while an efficient, fair, independent, and accessi-
ble judicial system is essential to the rule of law, ADR can be superior
from a rule of law perspective when a litigation system is inefficient,
corrupt, biased, or inaccessible. This argument has significant appeal,
and is consistent with our ADR export practices. The organizations
that have urged the export of ADR have focused on developing and
transitioning countries that have problematic litigation systems. Ef-
forts to encourage countries with better respected litigation systems to
adopt ADR have not occurred with the same frequency.
However, this notion that ADR is a second-best rule of law fails to
explain all of the justifications for sponsoring ADR in developing
countries. The organizations that have urged adoption of ADR as
part of rule of law efforts have not done so merely to promote access
to justice where courthouses are too costly, distant, or corrupt, but
also to build communities and promote conciliation. 59
Thinking of ADR as a second-best rule of law is not intellectually
satisfying because it fails to take into account the significant differ-
ences between litigious and nonlitigious modes of dispute resolution.
Specifically, where litigation is based on an attempt to follow publicly
enunciated statutes and rules, ADR often resolves disputes without
referencing such rules. 60
Finally, if ADR is needed as a rule of law supplement to litigation
to promote access to justice in other countries, surely that rationale
has some appeal in our country as well. While we may not have signif-
icant access problems due to lack of roads or even illiteracy, economic
barriers prevent many, if not most, disputants in the United States
from obtaining meaningful access to courts. 61 Thus, if lack of access
58. Cohen, supra note 41, at 297 (third alteration in original).
59. See ADR PRACTITIONERS' GUIDE, supra note 15.
60. This is particularly true of mediation, and less true of arbitration.
61. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 3 (2004) (explaining that while we
boast of our support of access to justice, in reality, millions of Americans are denied real access);
Robert Rubinson, A Theory of Access to Justice, 29 J. LEGAL PROF. 89, 100-02 (2005) (urging
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justifies the use of ADR as part of the rule of law abroad, that same
rationale should apply domestically as well.
C. The Third Way: Rethinking the Relationship Between
ADR and the Rule of Law
Can ADR be supportive of the rule of law for reasons beyond the
inadequacy of litigation? Or can ADR be supportive of justice, if not
the rule of law, for reasons beyond the inadequacy of litigation? How
do societies' laws and ADR procedures relate to societal norms? Al-
though exporters of ADR have not put a great deal of theoretical
thought into the question of whether or why ADR might be consistent
with the rule of law, their projects offer some useful insights for ex-
ploring these concepts.
1. The Relationship Between ADR and Litigation Systems
Domestically, there has been a tendency to view ADR and litiga-
tion as mutually exclusive terms. Many assume that either a dispute
will be resolved formally and openly through litigation, or it will be
resolved informally and privately through ADR. Though experienced
practitioners typically avoid this fallacy, students-and even academ-
ics-often presume that disputes will be resolved exclusively through
one means or the other.
Yet by exporting ADR as part of rule of law projects that also em-
phasize litigation, the exporters have made clear that ADR and litiga-
tion approaches often go hand in hand. For example, court-connected
mediation, arbitration, or other programs can be adjuncts to the ex-
isting litigation system, and judges can order disputes in litigation to
be transferred to those regimes. It seems that ADR and litigation ap-
proaches are closely related domestically as well, as I have discussed
in greater depth in other works.62 Whether the ADR process
originates from court orders, administrative rules, or contractual
agreements, a given dispute tends to shift back and forth between the
two systems over time. For example, in the United States, negotia-
tions and mediations are conducted in the shadow of possible litiga-
tion; arbitration agreements, awards, and settlements are enforced in
court, and cases that have been litigated for years may ultimately be
that, for the most part, the only persons or groups able to obtain access to the U.S. litigation
system are commercial organizations, affluent individuals, and persons engaged in "values con-
flicts" of significant interest to attract pro bono or reduced-fee representation).
62. Jean R. Sternlight, Separate and Not Equal: Integrating Civil Procedure and ADR in Legal
Academia, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 681, 690-700 (2005).
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resolved through ADR.63 While this relationship can be explored
outside the international context, the inclusion of ADR as part of in-
ternational rule of law projects may help make the connections more
obvious to commentators and policymakers at home.
I believe that the relationship between ADR and litigation, both
domestically and internationally, may be reflective of a more general
tension between formal and informal approaches to justice. Formal
and informal approaches each have their virtues and vices. 64 Whereas
formal rule-based systems can potentially offer more certainty and
transparency, such systems are frequently slower and more costly, and
they often fail to distinguish individual circumstances. 65 Thus,
throughout history and throughout the world, we have seen oscilla-
tions and tensions between formal and informal approaches. 66 For ex-
ample, a recent book describing dispute resolution in rural China
shows that these tensions exist in societies quite different from our
own.67
2. Relating ADR and Litigation to Norms
An extensive and rich domestic literature has explored the link be-
tween law and norms. While scholars' perspectives differ somewhat,
63. See id.
64. See, e.g., Jean R. Stemlight, ADR Is Here: Preliminary Reflections on Where It Fits in a
System of Justice, 3 NEV. L.J. 289 (2002-2003) (urging that a proper system of justice should
resolve societal as well as individual interests, seek societal harmony, and that both litigation and
ADR can serve such goals); Jean R. Sternlight, In Search of the Best Procedure for Enforcing
Employment Discrimination Laws: A Comparative Analysis, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1401 (2004) (ex-
amining tensions between using formal and informal systems to resolve employment discrimina-
tion complaints in the United States, Great Britain, and Australia).
65. See Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Jus-
tice, 40 AM. L. REV. 729, 731 (1906) ("The most important and most constant cause of dissatis-
faction with all law at all times is to be found in the necessarily mechanical operation of legal
rules.... Legal history shows an oscillation between wide judicial discretion on the one hand
and strict confinement of the magistrate by minute and detailed rules upon the other hand.").
66. See, e.g., Thomas 0. Main, ADR: The New Equity, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 329, 329-30 (2005)
(urging that just as the British system of equity sought to relieve problems and tensions created
by the strict common-law approach, ADR today is a release for pressures created by our formal
litigation system); Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, The Merger of Law and Mediation: Lessons from
Equity Jurisprudence and Roscoe Pound, 6 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 57, 58-59 (2004)
("Both equity and mediation offer a form of 'individualized justice' unavailable in the official
legal system, and each allow room for mercy in an otherwise rigid, rule-bound justice system.").
67. See Frank K. Upham, Who Will Find the Defendant if He Stays with His Sheep? Justice in
Rural China, 114 YALE L.J. 1675, 1714 (2005) (reviewing ZHU SULI, SENDING LAW TO THE
COUNTRYSIDE: RESEARCH ON CHINA'S BASIC-LEVEL JUDICIAL SYSTEM (2000), describing jus-
tice in rural China and urging that "[tlhe solution [to the tension], therefore, may be to institu-
tionalize the dialectic that Zhu describes between formal and informal, modern and customary,
center and periphery in a manner designed to make the norms created more accessible to the
public while also being respectful of local practices").
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virtually all agree that law and norms are distinct. The causal relation-
ship between law and norms, however, is less clear. Some suggest that
norms influence laws;68 others think that law influences norms.
69 Still
others believe that judges can find ways to influence norms using
means other than the mere issuance of final decisions on the merits.
70
Another popular belief is that the norms can be at least as important
as law in structuring social behavior. 71 Indeed, some have argued that
the imposition of law can be counterproductive to social order, in that
it can undermine norms that are already operating effectively. 72 In
addition, some claim that norms are more predictable than law.
73
By studying ADR in other countries, we may learn more about the
relationship between ADR and norms. Domestically, it is often sug-
gested that one of the advantages of mediation is that it allows parties
to resolve disputes according to their own preferences74 or according
68. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural
Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1694-95 (1996).
69. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021,
2025-29 (1996).
70. Susan Sturm, Law's Role in Addressing Complex Discrimination, in HANDBOOK OF EM-
PLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION RESEARCH: RIGHTS AND REALITIES 35, 50 (Laura Beth Nielsen &
Robert L. Nelson eds., 2005). Professor Sturm explained that judges can affect norms in three
ways:
1. Structuring occasions for collective norm development and problem solving in the
penumbra of formal judicial process;
2. Increasing non-legal actors' capacity to conduct conflict resolution and problem
solving that generates and institutionalizes efficient, fair, and workable norms; and
3. Developing the capacity of mediating actors, such as experts and administrative
agencies, to connect the domains of formal and informal norms.
Id.
71. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE Dis-
PUTES (1991) (showing that a close-knit group of Shasta County cattlemen structured their fenc-
ing and other behavior based on norms rather than law); Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of
Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
133, 155 (1996) ("The importance of maintaining a good reputation and of avoiding ostracism
deters improper behavior."); Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and
Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1603, 1603-04 (2000) (showing the impact of informal sanctions
such as shaming); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903
(1996) (showing the significant influence of extralegal norms on smoking, littering, and other
human behaviors).
72. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, The Destruction of Social Capital Through Law, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 2055, 2057 (1996).
73. See, e.g., Haini Guo & Bradley Klein, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Community: Neigh-
borly Dispute Resolution in Beijing Hutongs, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 825, 885-86 (2005)
(stating that in China, formal law is "muddy" and more unpredictable than social norms).
74. In mediation lingo, disputants are encouraged to engage in self-determination. See
MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (Am. Arbitration Ass'n., Am. Bar Ass'n &
Ass'n for Conflict Resolution 2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/dispute/news/Model-
StandardsofConductforMediatorsfinal05.pdf ("A mediator shall conduct a mediation based on
the principle of party self-determination. Self-determination is the act of coming to a voluntary,
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to relevant social norms, rather than strictly according to law.75 Thus,
in societies such as ours where law plays a central role, mediation of-
fers disputants an opportunity to resolve their disputes in a manner
different than the law might require. In societies in which formal law
does not play a central role, mediation or conciliation is conducted in
accordance with societal traditions or norms. 76 While many American
ADR advocates think a mediator should be a completely neutral
party, other societies believe that a mediator may help to infuse social
norms into the resolution of the dispute. 77 Similarly, arbitration is
often praised because it permits disputants to use their own selected
norms, which may be different from those chosen by the society at
large.78
Just as litigation and ADR can go hand in hand, a society can blend
reliance on norms and reliance on law. While we tend to assume that
law must be applied through formal government structures and that
norms can be applied only through informal nongovernment struc-
uncoerced decision in which each party makes free and informed choices as to process and out-
come."); see also Wayne D. Brazil, Should Court-Sponsored ADR Survive?, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON
Disp. RESOL. 241, 270 (2006) ("If there is one mantra that dominates mediation theory, it is
party self-determination."). But see James R. Coben, Gollum, Meet Smagol. A Schizophrenic
Rumination on Mediator Values Beyond Self-Determination and Neutrality, 5 CARDOZO J. CON-
FLICr RESOL. 65, 70-72 (2004) (arguing that while self-determination is said to be mediation's
"prime directive," it is appropriate to question "the underlying legitimacy of a disputing process
committed to self-determination and neutrality of intervention in a society plagued by asymmet-
ric distribution of power"); Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation:
What's Justice Got to Do with It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787 (2001) (contrasting the aspiration of
party self-determination with the realities of court-connected mediation, and expressing concern
that many court mediation programs do not serve disputants' interests in procedural justice).
75. See generally Clark Freshman, Privatizing Same-Sex "Marriage" Through Alternative Dis-
pute Resolution: Community-Enhancing Versus Community-Enabling Mediation, 44 UCLA L.
REV. 1687 (1997) (suggesting that mediation can be a means for disputants to enforce the com-
munity's norms that they deem most relevant); Clark Freshman, The Promise and Perils of
"Our" Justice: Psychological, Critical and Economic Perspectives on Communities and Prejudices
in Mediation, 6 CARDOZO J. CONFL CT RESOL. 1 (2004) (examining the extent to which media-
tion may promote justice by permitting social subgroups to base decisions on their own norms).
76. See, e.g., James A. Wall, Jr. & Ronda Roberts Callister, Ho'oponopono: Some Lessons
from Hawaiian Mediation, 11 NEGOTIATION J. 45 (1995) (describing the traditional Hawaiian
and Polynesian dispute resolution method, Ho'oponopono); Robert Yazzie, "Life Comes from
It": Navajo Justice Concepts, 24 N.M. L. REV. 175. 180-87 (1994) (describing the Navajo peace-
making process).
77. Yazzie, supra note 76, at 181-82; see also Donna Coker, Enhancing Autonomy for Battered
Women: Lessons from Navajo Peacemaking, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1, 35 (1999) (describing the role
played by tribal "peacemakers" in Navajo peacemaking procedures and noting "[t]he peace-
maker, usually chosen by his or her chapter, is a respected person with a demonstrated knowl-
edge of traditional Navajo stories" (citation omitted)).
78. Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 135-43 (1992) (discussing the shortcomings of the
American legal system as it relates to the diamond industry and how the industry has adapted to
enforce extralegal agreements).
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
tures, a fascinating recent study of dispute resolution in rural China
shows that this assumption can be wrong. It demonstrates that re-
sidents of Beijing neighborhoods called "hutongs" relied primarily on
informal social norms to resolve their disputes, 79 although these
norms were applied with the assistance of committees of local re-
sidents and the neighborhood police.8 0 Similarly, Professor Susan
Sturm has recently urged that we rethink our core assumptions about
ADR. She argues that nonlitigation dispute resolution need not al-
ways be private, and that conciliatory approaches can enforce dispu-
tants' legal rights and inculcate social norms.81
3. What Can We Realistically Expect from ADR or Litigation
Alone?
Given the links between ADR and litigation, and the important role
played by societal norms, advocates of both ADR and litigation have
a tendency to be unrealistically optimistic regarding the possible bene-
fits of either approach. By examining the international blending of
ADR and rule of law efforts, we can better understand the cultural,
economic, and social limits that potentially constrain progress when
either approach is used alone. We may also begin to understand how
blending ADR and the rule of law yields a more just dispute resolu-
tion system than either single approach can.
a. Limits to the Traditional Rule of Law Approach
As has been thoroughly discussed in the academic rule of law litera-
ture, there seem to be limits on the extent to which traditional rule of
law projects, particularly those imported from other countries, can
fundamentally change a country's approach to law.8 2 Whether the
goal is to eliminate corruption, increase access to justice, promote
transparency, or protect individual rights, it is clear that providing ju-
dicial training and modernizing courthouses may not be sufficient to
change a legal culture. For example, it is well recognized that the ex-
79. Guo & Klein, supra note 73, at 827 (commenting that more formal channels were typically
"viewed as too costly, socially disruptive, and unpredictable to be an efficient option in all but
the most serious disputes").
80. Id. at 827-28.
81. Sturm, supra note 70, at 54-56 (explaining that although current critiques that ADR is
private, unaccountable, and does not generate norms are often well founded, we must consider
the possibility that judicial involvement can be used to ensure ADR is "norm generating, trans-
parent, and accountable, at least at the systemic level").
82. To some extent rule of law and other development projects can be counterproductive. See
DAVI) KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE: REASSESSING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARI-
ANISM 3-35 (2004) (detailing numerous problems with using a human rights-based approach to
assist other countries' development).
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tensive, traditional Latin American rule of law projects in the 1970s
made few fundamental advances.83 Professor Rosa Ehrenreich
Brooks and others have analyzed how entrenched legal norms impede
rule of law efforts. 84 A number of scholars have emphasized that the
rule of law is an inherently Western construct and that persons in
countries with different cultures and histories, such as China, may not
share the perspective that increasing the role of formal law is the best
way to create a just society.85 Further, countries may be unable to
provide effective access to litigation due to their limited resources.
The well-developed domestic literature on problems of access to jus-
tice shows that, even in a rich country like the United States, we have
grave problems assuring that the average person can obtain justice.86
Moreover, Professor Marc Galanter's work shows that even an osten-
sibly fair litigation system can prove ineffective in eliminating eco-
nomic and social inequalities.87
b. Limits to the ADR-Only Approach
The limitations of ADR, at least in the international context, have
not been as thoroughly analyzed. Yet it seems that the proponents of
ADR in international rule of law projects may be unduly optimistic in
83. Such projects were called democratization, but their content was similar to what we now
call rule of law projects. See, e.g., JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAW-
YERS AND FOREIGN AID IN LATIN AMERICA (1980) (voicing regrets of a former Ford Foundation
official regarding 1970s rule of law projects in Latin America); David M. Trubek & Marc Ga-
lanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development
Studies in the United States, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 1062 (critiquing development approaches used in
the early 1970s); see also THOMAS CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD: THE LEARNING
CURVE (1999) (setting out mixed views of democratization projects from the 1960s through the
1990s); PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE (Thomas
Carothers ed., 2006) (collecting essays on democratization efforts).
84. Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and the "Rule of Law,"
101 MICH. L. REV. 2275, 2283-89 (2003).
85. See, e.g., Lan Cao, Introduction to Symposium, The "Rule of Law" in China, 11 Wm. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 539, 542 (2003) (noting that the Chinese may have a very different attitude
toward the rule of law than Americans do, and that "rule of law" translates into Chinese as "rule
by law," which implies a more authoritarian approach); Pat K. Chew, The Rule of Law: China's
Skepticism and the Rule of People, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 43, 48-54 (2005) (discussing
China's ongoing tension between the Western rule of law approach and the traditional Chinese
preference for rule of people); Stephenson, supra note 46, at 76 (discussing the Chinese govern-
ment's resistance to the phrase "rule of law"); Benedict Sheehy, Fundamentally Conflicting
Views of the Rule of Law in China and the West and Implications for Commercial Disputes, 26
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 225 (2006). But see RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH
TOWARD RULE OF LAW (2002) (presenting a more optimistic view on Chinese enthusiasm for
the rule of law).
86. See Rubinson, supra note 61, at 100-02. See generally RHODE, supra note 61.
87. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95, 119-22 (1974).
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their belief that ADR can solve problems of corruption, access to jus-
tice, and social inequality.
First, while advocates suggest that replacing or supplementing liti-
gation with ADR could reduce corruption, it is not obvious why this
would be so. To the extent that a culture of corruption exists,
mediators and arbitrators could fall prey to the same temptations as
judges. Even though mediation does not result in resolution unless all
of the disputants come to an agreement, a corrupt or biased mediator
could still have a significant impact on that resolution. The private
setting of ADR may also enhance existing corruption problems. Pro-
ponents urge that transparency and public access are important ways
to fight corruption and bias, yet ADR is typically conducted privately.
Second, although it is often true that ADR is less expensive than
litigation, this does not necessarily mean that providing ADR solves
problems of access to justice. Depending on the type of ADR and the
quality of the results, ADR may not provide access to justice. If the
ADR process is biased and unfair, there may be no justice at all.
Third, to the extent that rule of law projects establish significant
ADR programs in the absence of effective accessible litigation,
whether such programs can truly provide justice is unclear. In the
United States, ADR typically works because it operates in the shadow
of an effective litigation system.88 Disputes are often resolved in ne-
gotiation or mediation because parties know that if they do not re-
solve the disputes informally, they will have to resort to litigation.
Similarly, parties contract to take disputes to arbitration because they
know that courts exist to ensure that the arbitration clause and arbi-
tral award are enforced. It is also unclear whether ADR can work
without the threat of litigation. This issue is critically important to
contemplating the effectiveness of ADR in some of the countries to
which it is currently being exported.
There is no doubt that societies can effectively resolve disputes in-
dependently of the litigation system. Comparative and historical legal
research shows that many societies, including our own, have used
means other than litigation to resolve disputes.89 Absent court en-
88. See Raymond Shonholtz, The Mediating Future, 552 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
Sci., July 1997, at 139, 141 (recognizing that the Western conception of mediation depends on the
existence of a background formal legal structure).
89. See SIMON ROBERTS, ORDER AND DISPUTE: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL ANTHROPOL-
OGY 26-27 (1979) ("[E]ven where judicial institutions are found they do not always enjoy the
unchallenged pre-eminence in the business of dispute settlement which our courts claim and
manage to exercise. Fighting and other forms of self-help, resort to supernatural agencies, the
use of shaming and ridicule, or the unilateral withdrawal of essential forms of cooperation may
all constitute equally approved and effective means of handling conflict."). See generally JER-
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forcement, arbitration can work to the extent that the society's respect
for the status of the arbitrator and the process of arbitration is suffi-
cient to ensure compliance with arbitral agreements or awards. Simi-
larly, conciliatory forms of dispute resolution, such as negotiation and
mediation, can be effective, absent litigation, to the degree that social
norms and bonds pressure parties into resolving their disputes and
abiding by their agreements. In short, what we might call peer pres-
sure can take the place of an effective litigation system, and allow
ADR mechanisms to function without a backdrop of litigation.90
However, to the extent that the effectiveness of ADR relies on the
existence of such social norms and pressures, it is unclear whether
ADR alone can ensure justice or resolve social inequalities. ADR
programs have been implemented abroad for many reasons. Some of
these programs use ADR to empower the powerless or wrest control
from the elite. For example, recall the Nepalese "mediation" program
described by Cohen, which was geared toward protecting human
rights,91 and the Nicaraguan mediation program designed to protect
women from domestic violence. 92 To the extent that ADR programs
like these are not linked to a functioning litigation system, established
social interests may have little incentive to relinquish any of their
power in mediation. Idealists might believe that once the powerful
elite are eye to eye with the powerless, they will decide to share their
OLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? (1983) (examining informal and nonadversarial
forms of justice throughout American history); Laura Nader, Harmony Models and the Con-
struction of Law, in CONFLICT RESOLUTION: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 41 (Kevin
Avruch et al. eds., 1991) (considering cultural aspects of alternative dispute resolution models
and discussing modern anthropologists' frequent biases in favor of harmony models).
90. Nepalese mediation apparently relies on community pressure. Professors C.J. Larkin and
Pamela DeVoe explain that mediation sessions include villagers as well as disputants and
mediators, and that the villagers are "both audience and participants." Larkin & DeVoe, supra
note 44, at 23. They also report that failure to reach an agreement "appears to be rare," and that
at least one study showed "a decline in the level of violence and prejudice against women in
areas where there were women's community mediation groups." Id.; cf. Richard L. Abel, Intro-
duction, in 2 THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE 1 (Richard L. Abel ed., 1982). Professor Abel
explains that the informal justice that works well in precapitalist societies "cannot be recreated
under Western capitalism":
Precapitalist legal informalism is embedded in and contingent upon a social structure in
which: relationships are multiplex and continuous, the supporters of one disputant are
bound to the other by crosscutting ties, there is little residential mobility, and reputa-
tion in the face-to-face community is highly valued and easily lost in the absence of
privacy. Western capitalism not only lacks these qualities but also actively rejects
them.... It is not surprising, therefore, that when informal legal institutions are intro-
duced into Western capitalist societies they do not help to preserve relationships ... but
rather serve to celebrate their termination.
Id. at 2-3.
91. Cohen, supra note 41.
92. Aldana & Saucedo, supra note 49.
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power and wealth.93 This may occur. But it seems more likely that
such mechanisms will be successful in redistributing power only to the
extent that the weaker members of the society can use political, physi-
cal, or economic influence to demand such redistribution. 94
Empirical investigations may teach us how to blend formal and in-
formal justice systems. While a full study is beyond the scope of this
Article, India and Japan offer intriguing possibilities. In India, sub-
stantial efforts have been made to informalize the justice system to
provide greater access to justice. A number of analysts have criticized
these attempts, urging that they ultimately do not serve the purposes
for which they were designed. 95 But at least one analyst suggests that
Japan's concerted effort to rely more extensively on conciliation and
other informal means of dispute resolution has been effective. Profes-
sor Frank Upham explains that, although it is widely assumed that
Japan has always been an antilitigious country, Japan's preference for
conciliatory approaches has been instilled deliberately by political
forces. 96 Upham notes that while in the early 1970s litigation was
common in Japan, thereafter the government, courts, bar associations,
and others reduced the number of lawyers and lawsuits, and replaced
them with an array of administrative and ADR processes. 97 Given the
great economic success of the Japanese while using a substantially
conciliatory system, Upham urges that developing countries may not
necessarily want to adopt a formal rule of law system.98
93. See, e.g., ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION:
RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION 261-84 (1994) (argu-
ing that when disputants come face to face in mediation, there is at least the potential that they
will develop a better understanding of, and empathy for, their fellow disputants' perspectives.
and become empowered to resolve the disputes in ways that are mutually beneficial).
94. Aldana and Saucedo have reached a similar conclusion, and thus, urge that mediation
must be linked to rather than replace litigation. Aldana & Saucedo, supra note 49, at 3.
95. See, e.g., Marc Galanter & Jayanth K. Krishnan, Debased Informalism: Lok Adalats and
Legal Rights in Modern India, in BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO
THE RULE OF LAW 96, 126 (Erik G. Jensen & Thomas C. Heller eds., 2003) (urging that lok
adalats, established in the 1980s, "hold little promise for delivering effective legal services to
those most in need"); see also Sarah Leah Whitson, "Neither Fish, nor Flesh, nor Good Red
Herring" Lok Adalats: An Experiment in Informal Dispute Resolution in India, 15 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 391, 392 (1992) (claiming that the lok adalats have become yet another
"moribund institution" that subverts the rights of the poor).
96. Frank Upham, Mythmaking in the Rule-of-Law Orthodoxy, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF
LAW ABROAD, supra note 83, at 75, 91-98; see also John Owen Haley, The Politics of Informal
Justice: The Japanese Experience, 1922-1942, in 2 THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE, supra
note 90, at 125 (providing another account of the Japanese attempt to replace litigation with
conciliation).
97. Upham, supra note 96, at 91, 97.
98. Id. at 98-101.
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V. Is THE RULE OF LAW AN END IN ITSELF OR A
MEANS TO AN END?
The relationship between ADR and the rule of law and how coun-
tries might structure their legal systems is now clearer. As Professor
Carrie Menkel-Meadow has explained, one of the real virtues of the
American export of ADR is that it offers the United States the oppor-
tunity to import additional knowledge about ADR.99 The comparison
of the domestic and international discussions of the relationship be-
tween ADR and the rule of law offers several key insights.
First, attempting to build dispute resolution systems that are either
exclusively formal or exclusively informal can be problematic. Exclu-
sively formal systems are often expensive, inaccessible, and unable to
serve all of the conciliatory interests that can be served by an informal
system. Purely informal systems can also be problematic, unless the
community is small enough that the informal mechanism will be suffi-
ciently transparent and enforceable. We must also consider norms, as
well as formally adopted laws, in determining how societies' disputes
are and ought to be resolved.
Second, the question of whether ADR and the rule of law are con-
sistent is semantic. If the rule of law is narrowly defined only to in-
clude litigation-oriented approaches, then most ADR processes are
inconsistent with the rule of law. If, on the other hand, the rule of law
is more broadly defined, as it sometimes has been in the international
context, then rule of law projects may include ADR elements. To the
extent the discussion remains on this purely semantic level, it is not
particularly interesting.
Third, a far more interesting and substantive question is whether we
should favor the rule of law as an end in and of itself, or whether we
should treat the rule of law as a means to an end. In my view, com-
paring the domestic and international treatments of ADR and the rule
of law shows that we ought to consider how the rule of law is or can be
part of a larger vision of justice. 100 Interestingly, this fundamental is-
sue is not typically explored in any depth. While commentators often
examine the virtues of the rule of law (transparency, fairness, equality,
etc.), they rarely consider whether a rule of law approach is essential
to protect those values, or whether other systems of dispute resolution
might be as good as, or even better than, the rule of law. Whereas
99. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Exporting and Importing ADR: "I've Looked at Life from Both
Sides Now," Disp. RESOL. MAO., Spring 2006, at 5.
100. Cf. id. (explaining that ADR's legitimacy can be established by values other than the rule
of law, such as treaties, consent, and economic and trade values).
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Westerners typically place great value on the rule of law for fostering
individual rights and protecting the individual from the state, not all
societies share this vision. Some Chinese, for example, see the rule of
law as a tool of state oppression, and favor reliance on informal norms
and personal relationships over reliance on formal law.10 1 Similarly,
ADR may operate differently in societies, such as China, that are
more communitarian and less individualistic than our own. The goal
of mediation in many societies is to preserve or create harmonious
social relationships, and not merely to maximize individual self-inter-
est. For example, mediation in China focuses more on preserving re-
lationships, status, and social ties, and less on protecting individual
rights. 102
Fourth, examining the links between ADR, the rule of law, and jus-
tice requires us to rethink the meaning of these terms. Creating a
harmonious society is not part of the traditional definition of the rule
of law, and yet some would say that learning to live together harmoni-
ously, as a community, is a critical aspect of justice. For example, Ar-
istotle's and Plato's definitions of justice emphasized the importance
of all components of the society joining together to do a job well.'0 3 A
variety of non-Western societies also rely on their systems of justice to
provide harmony, balance, or reconciliation.' 0 4 At the same time,
some might advocate using dispute resolution processes to effectuate
social change and eliminate inequalities. But while American com-
mentators who adopt this belief tend to assume that rights-based liti-
gation is the best dispute resolution technique for achieving social
change, perhaps it is not. For example, Professors Amy Cohen and
Ellen Deason write that "[c]ommunity mediation boards in Nepal and
Bangladesh combine individual dispute settlement with attention to
remedying some of the cultural and class inequalities affecting women
and other marginalized groups. '10 5
In short, the efforts to include ADR as part of the rule of law
projects intuitively recognize the importance of harmony, reconcilia-
tion, balance, and equality as parts of a fundamental vision of jus-
101. See Chew, supra note 85, at 51-52.
102. See GOH BEE CHEN, LAW WITHOUT LAWYERS, JUSTICE WITHOUT COURTS: ON TRADI-
TIONAL CHINESE MEDIATION 15-18 (2002).
103. Sternlight, supra note 64, at 302.
104. Id. at 301; see also MERRY, supra note 51, at 113-33 (discussing the traditional Fijian
process of "bulubulu," during which "a person apologizes for an offense and offers a whale's
tooth (tabua) and a gift and asks forgiveness," and also describing this process as a traditional
means for achieving reconciliation within the society, but one which sometimes creates
problems, particularly in modern settings, like rape crime proceedings).
105. Amy J. Cohen & Ellen E. Deason, Comparative Considerations: Toward the Global
Transfer of Ideas About Dispute System Design, DIsP. RESOL. MAO., Spring 2006, at 23.
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tice. 106 By labeling ADR projects as rule of law projects and using
them to achieve or work toward peace, perhaps we are beginning to
recognize that our definition of justice ought to be broadened to in-
clude harmony and social equality as well as individual rights.107 As
Roscoe Pound explained a century ago, while law may serve justice,
justice is broader than law. t08
Those who have included ADR as part of rule of law projects may
not have consciously focused on the meaning of justice or where ADR
and the rule of law might fit into a definition of justice. Nonetheless,
the intuition that led to the expansion of rule of law projects may help
us to broaden our inquiries into the nature of justice-both here and
abroad.
106. See Richard L. Abel, The Contradictions of Informal Justice, in 1 THE POLITICS OF INFOR-
MAL JUSTICE 267 (Richard L. Abel ed., 1982). Abel approaches some of the issues discussed in
this Article from a somewhat different perspective, focusing on the contradictions of informal
justice. He concludes that informal processes can both ameliorate and aggravate existing ine-
qualities, and can stimulate and prevent popular participation. See id. While clearly recognizing
flaws of informal justice, he also sees potential virtues:
Yet, if the goals of informal justice are contradictory, and if it is incapable of realizing
them because of contradictions inherent in advanced capitalism, informalism should
not simplistically be repudiated as merely an evil to be resisted, or be dismissed as a
marginal phenomenon that can safely be ignored. It is advocated by reformers and
embraced by disputants precisely because it expresses values that deservedly elicit
broad allegiance: the preference for harmony over conflict, for mechanisms that offer
equal access to the many rather than unequal privilege to the few, that operate quickly
and cheaply, that permit all citizens to participate in decision making rather than limit-
ing authority to "professionals," that are familiar rather than esoteric, and that strive
for and achieve substantive justice rather than frustrating it in the name of form. Those
ideals must, and will, continue to inspire the struggle to create the institutions-and the
society-that can realize them.
Id. at 310.
107. See Robert M. Ackerman, Disputing Together: Conflict Resolution and the Search for
Community, 18 OHIo ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 27, 91 (2002) ("The ultimate promise for dispute
resolution is that it can harness and nurture the will to play together so that society is more than
the sum total of disparate notes, but rather a cohesive-albeit sometimes discordant-tune.");
Stanley Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Chinese Law Reform After Twenty Years, 20 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 383, 388 (2000) (observing that much of China's pro-mediation philosophy stems from
Mao's insistence that unlike litigation, mediation will serve to bring the community together
rather than push it apart). See generally Oko, supra note 42 (asserting that for some countries,
development of the rule of law may not be the ultimate end, and that, instead, the ultimate end
sought ought to be peaceful resolution of disputes); Shonholtz, supra note 88.
108. Pound, supra note 65, at 732-33 ("Justice, which is the end of law, is the ideal compro-
mise between the activities of each and the activities of all in a crowded world. The law seeks to
harmonize these activities and to adjust the relations of every man with his fellows so as to
accord with the moral sense of the community. When the community is at one in its ideas of
justice, this is possible. When the community is divided and diversified, and groups and classes
and interests, understanding each other none too well, have conflicting ideas of justice, the task
is extremely difficult. It is impossible that legal and ethical ideas should be in entire accord in
such a society.").
